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Abstract 
Capital structure is a vital area under discussion for firms since the cost of financing is fundamental to the 
company's ability to be competitive. The cost of debt and cost of equity does not follow the same patterns, and 
the implication thereof affects the firm's cost of capital, manoeuvrability and risk profile, including both distress 
risk and take-over risks linked to the subject are also ownership structures and value creation for shareholders 
given the diversification between the residual claimants and debt-holders. The purpose of this paper was 
reviewing the existing literature on the relationship between capital structure and the Market Timing theory of 
capital structure in the contact of emerging markets. The findings of the study indicated that there are several 
mixed results among the researchers on the subject and this has put forward areas of future research in the 
context of developing markets.  
Keywords: Capital structure, Market Timing Signaling theory, Agency Cost Theory, Pecking Order Theory, and 
Tradeoff Theory 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
As Myers (2001) aptly notes, "Even 40 years after the Modigliani and Miller research, our understanding of 
these firms' financing choices is limited". Myers and Majluf (1984) presented a paper on the significant 
development of the Pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf 1984). The Pecking order together with the Trade-
off theory is well-established regarding capital structure choices. However, there is a more modern addition that 
has recently found its way to the textbooks. The general market condition when a firm search for financing can 
affect the capital structure outcome hence leading to different capital structure result regarded as optimal for 
similar companies.  
 
One of the recent efforts to understand the capital structure decisions is based on "market timing" theory 
proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2002) following Stein (1996). This theory attempts to answer the question by 
stating that; "capital structure is a cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market" Baker and 
Wurgler (2002). The primary focus of this theory is the market's valuation of the company about management's 
view of the firm's intrinsic value. Hence the firm is inclined to issue equity when it is highly valued. Market 
timing theory suggests that managers can increase current shareholders' wealth by timing the issue of securities.  
Accordingly, firms are likely to issue equity when the stock prices are overvalued and repurchase equity when 
the market undervalues stock prices. 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) presented this theory with evidence from US firms. The theory has been tested with 
evidence from the G-7 countries (Mahajan and Tartaroglu 2007), Dutch firms (Bie and Haan 2007), Shenzhen, 
China firms (Tian, et al.; 2008) and further evidence from US firms (Elliott, et al.; 2007). Notably, these 
investigations have been recently published indicating that this defines the scientific border of today. The finding 
shows that on short-term market timing effects can be proven. However, the long-term persistence differs 
considerably. While the short-run impact of market timing is well documented in the literature, (for instance, 
Taggart, 1977; Ikenberry et al.; 1995), which Baker and Wurgler (2002) were the first to draw attention to the 
long-term effects of market timing on capital structure. The lack of consensus constitutes a knowledge gap. The 
researchers did not consider what happens in markets where repurchase of share is not allowed.  
 
1.1.1 Market Timing  
Equity market timing is one of the primary factors that shape corporate financing decisions. The market timing 
(or windows of opportunity) theory, states that firms tend to prefer external equity when the cost of equity is low 
and prefer debt otherwise. According to market timing theory, corporate executives sometimes perceive their 
risky securities as mispriced by the market. In a situation when the firms need to finance a particular project, 
they issue equity when they perceive the relative cost of equity is low, and issue debt when the also perceive that 
the cost of equity is high. How do the firms judge the relative cost of capital? On the one hand, they may know 
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themselves or their industries well. On the other hand, they may follow certain psychological or market patterns. 
For example, reference points, as suggested by prospect theory, may play an important role Casual conversations 
with investment bankers suggest that when they advise their clients on the choice between debt and external 
equity financing, the most important factor they consider is whether their clients' share prices are at a 52-week 
high. 
 
This study is a critical literature review of the impact of market timing on the capital structure of listed firms. 
Therefore there is need to identify the context of the study and the objective in this chapter. 
1.1.2 Capital Structure 
Capital structure refers to the firm's financial framework, which consists of the debt and equity used to finance 
the company. Capital structure is one of the favourite topics among the scholars in the finance field. The ability 
of firms to carry out their stakeholders' needs is tightly related to capital structure. Capital structure in financial 
term means the way company finances their assets through the combination of equity, debt, or hybrid securities 
Saad, (2010). Hence proper capital structure maximises the profitability and the long-term value of the firm for 
its shareholders. There is a high awareness among researchers to carry out the researchers in the area of the 
corporate capital structure. There are limited studies on the impact of market timing on the capital structure of 
listed firms available in the developing markets. There is a need to conduct research in the developing market to 
empower investors and enterprises to access information about the capital market. 
 
The subject of the capital structure remains interesting and puzzling topics, in which debt and equity are 
critically important to firms' performance, and this is the responsibility of managers to make the best mix of 
securities to maximise firm value. Baker and Wurgler (2002) refer capital structure as the cumulative outcome of 
past attempts to ‘time the market', i.e. issuing shares when equity is overvalued and purchasing shares in the case 
when they undervalue. 
 
1.1.3 Relationship between Market Timing and Capital Structure 
Market timing is based on the assumption that firms time the market when to issue equity subscription by the 
public. The theory argues that new shares are only issued at a time when the share prices are high and repurchase 
when the prices are lower. There are two versions of market timing theory that have led to dynamics in capital 
structure as follows: First is the assumption that economic agents are rational Myers and Majluf, (1984). Firms 
issue equity directly after a real information release that reduces information asymmetry problem between the 
management of the enterprise and stockholders. Then the reduction in asymmetry coincides with a rise in the 
stock price.  
 
This triggers firms to create their timing opportunities. The second theory assumes irrationality of economic 
agents Baker and Wurgler, (2002) which results in time-varying mispricing of a company's stock. More 
specifically, managers synchronise their financing decisions with the equity market, that is, the company issues 
equity when the equity value is high and repurchase when equity value are little.  As a consequence, the firm's 
cost of capital will decrease, and the current shareholders will benefit from this situation. Baker and Wurgler 
(2002), provide supportive evidence that equity market timing has a persistent effect on the firm's capital 
structure. Their study defines a measure for market timing as a weighted average of external capital needs over a 
few past years, where the weights used are a market to book values of the firm. Their finding was that changes in 
leverage are vigorously and positively related to their market timing measure, so their conclusion was that a 
company's capital structure was a cumulative outcome of attempts in the past to time the equity market. 
 
After Baker and Wurgler (2002), studies on the impact of market timing on capital have gained momentum. 
Some papers confirm the influence of market timing on capital structure (e.g. Jenter, 2005; Elliott et al., 2007, 
Huang and Ritter, 2009). Therefore, empirical support for the market timing theory comes not only equity market 
but also debt market (Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; Henderson et al., 2006). The historical market values are 
strongly related to capital structure, and this leads to the conclusion that, capital structure is the cumulative 
outcome of past attempts at equity market timing Baker and Wurgler (2002).   
 
Their results demonstrate that market timing does have an impact on the capital structure, but the effect does not 
persist for a long time. Some recent studies have examined whether historical securities issues have robust and 
long-lasting effects on capital structure, Kayhan and Titman (2004). We find that the adjustment speed toward 
target leverage is slow, and past securities issues have dynamic and long-lasting effects on capital structure, after 
controlling for firm characteristics that determine target leverage. The lack of local studies on the impact of 
market timing on capital structure locally and the mixed findings in the developed market need to be investigated 
in the further research using the locally available data to close the knowledge identified through this technical 
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literature review. 
 
1.2 Statement of Problem 
The subject of capital structures has been highly debated for decades and hence the vast amount of papers 
supporting different details of the established theories that can be found. However, the Market Timing Theory is 
relatively modern and less investigated. In this thesis we do not attempt to find a universal answer to Myers 
(1984) question on how firms choose their capital structure, nor did Baker and Wurgler (2002). They recognise 
all established forces that simultaneously affect a company's capital structure as valid, but they found proof of 
that the Market Timing out powered them in impact and importance regards their sample of US firms. Miller and 
Modigliani (1958) initiated the debate by presenting a static and partial equilibrium analysis with the assumption 
of, more or less, entire markets. They made these drastic simplifications to "come to grips with the problem at 
all" Miller and Modigliani (1958). They encouraged other researchers to follow them in investigating the field in 
the direction of greater realism and relevance. 
 
The developing market, which is the focus of this technical literature review, has its history and some 
characteristics, i.e. industries, ownership structures, bank spheres, the proportion of large firms and its maturity 
profile as well as governmental monetary policies (Oxelheim and Forssbaeck 2003). Compared to previous 
studies conducted developed market these characteristics differ quite dramatically. The ownership structures in 
the US are highly dispersed in opposition to the often-concentrated ownership that exists in the developing 
market. The secure connection between ownership structures and capital structures emphasize the vast potential 
contribution of an investigation of this geographic area. Another mean difference to earlier studies of market 
timing in the US is the presence of bank spheres in the developed market. This fact adds influence to the debt 
holders and hence affecting the capital structure in ways that not will occur in countries with weaker banks, 
(Clarke 2007).  
 
These variations between regions previously investigated regarding market timing make the developing market 
attractive in the sense that the generality of market timing can be further tested and this would contribute to the 
available on corporate performance in the developing markets. The tribute aimed is to recommence further 
investigation to what extent Market Timing does out power other forces, as shown by a sample of the firms from 
developing, – or not. 
 
The possibility to access international cost of capital regarding both debt and equity during the time span of this 
investigation is however provided by the financial markets and is affected but not decided or controlled by 
politics. Even so, the relevance of investigating markets separately enhanced by some of the conclusions found 
in Oxelheim and Whilborg (2008) where it is stated that there is not yet one single European money market, and 
path dependency and actual lock-in effects still prevail.  
 
Furthermore, most of the studies on the impact of market timing on the capital structure were conducted in the 
developed market and no local studies, which have attempted to address similar effects of market timing on 
capital structure in the developing market. Therefore the lack of research in developing market is the biggest 
problem that needs to be filled by theoretical literature review. The macroeconomics environments from 
developed and developing market are completely different in term of advancement as the developing market still 
at its infancy stage. There is also an issue of the repurchase of shares, which is not allowed in some developing 
market like Kenya. This is why it is importance to conduct studies locally to inform policy makers whether 
repurchase of shares to the firm performance.  
 
Emerging from these studies is the knowledge gap on the degree of impacts of market timing on the capital 
structure of developing market e.g. East Africa financial markets. This theoretical literature review seeks to fill 
those gaps. This study seeks to critically review capital structure theories and issues related to the impact of 
market timing on capital structure. 
 
1.3 Objectives of the research 
The broad purpose of the study is to conduct a review of existing literature to determine the impacts of market 
timing on the capital structure of the firms. The specific objectives generated from this general aim include  
(i) To establish the effect of market timing on capital structure in developing the market. 
(ii) To conduct a literature review to determine whether market timing has a long-run persistent 
effect on capital structure in developing the market. 
(iii) To establish the relevance of market timing on the capital structure of firms in developing the 
market. 
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(iv) To draw conclusion and market relevant policy recommendations based on the findings from the 
existing literature and fill the gaps in the developing market. 
(v) To determine the knowledge gaps on the degree of impacts of market timing on the capital 
structure of firms in developing markets.  
 
1.4 Significance of the research 
This theoretical review contributes to the available literature on the market timing and capital structure of the 
company from difference markets using available literature to identify knowledge gaps. Identifying the existence 
of equity market timing in this area tests the ability to generalise the concept of the market timing to different 
contexts. It is hoped that the reviews will suggest significant policy interventions through its recommendations 
that should help policymakers to come up with appropriate strategies to address the challenges that firms often 
encounter as a result of making inappropriate financing decisions.  A company's capital structure decision is at 
the heart of many other decisions in the area of corporate finance. A study by Collier and Gunning (1999) 
established that most firms in Africa are still in an infancy stage and experience slow growth due to lack of 
information available.  One factor, which has been identified, to contribute to this state is inappropriate capital 
decision making.  
 
Through the knowledge gaps identified from the existing literature, academician and practitioners may use the 
theoretical literature review as the cornerstone for future research that could help in the development of 
corporate furnace as investors are in need of more information for appropriate financing decisions with less 
transaction and cost of capital.  
 
The theoretical literature is expected to make a valuable contribution to the body knowledge in the area of 
financial economics. Since previous studies in this area in Kenya (Gachoki, 2005; Kiogora, 2002; Nyangoro, 
2003) majorly focused on the relationship between firms specific factors and capital structure while ignoring the 
possible implication of market timing on the capital structure of the companies. This review intended to act as a 
critical tool in decision making by policy makers by providing knowledge to help in the future projection of a 
company's capital structure. Hence the study will be useful in providing exposition on the impact of market 
timing on capital structure. 
 
2.1 Theoretical Literature Review 
This section presents literature review related to the capital structure of firms' to set the foundation for the 
analysis of the impact of market timing on capital structure.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
There are several supporting theories utilised in the original Market Timing Theory proposed by Baker and 
Wurgler (2002). Furthermore, their followers have established these supporting theories as they are in all the 
other studies of market timing. The consensus is reached regarding the theories from Miller and Modigliani as 
well as the pecking order and the trade-off theory as a necessary framework to visualise the effects of market 
timing. The research in the field of corporate finance regarding capital structure utilises these theories to sort out 
and position almost every offspring or aspect thereof that they look into.  
 
2.2.1 Market Timing Theory 
The seminal work of Baker and Wurgler (2002) put some light on the capital structure issue. The authors suggest 
that it was difficult to explain the choice of financing within the traditional theories. As it is based on empirical 
findings of the window-of-opportunities hypothesis, they propose the market timing theory, which states that 
capital structure evolves as the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market. The firm can 
choose to issue equity when their shares have high market values relative to their book and previous market 
value. This always lowered the firms' costs of capital and benefited current shareholders at the expense of new 
shareholders. When shares are undervalued the firm conduct repurchases when both debt and equity markets are 
unusually favourable, managers will raise funds even though the company has no need for financing currently. 
This theory also states that market timing of equity issues has enormous and persistent impacts on the leverage 
ratio.  
 
There are two forms of the market timing theory. The first one comes from the dynamic model of Myers and 
Majluf (1984), which assumes that managers and investors are rational and adverse selection varies across firms 
or over a particular period. When positive information is released to the market firms issue shares immediately, it 
reduced information asymmetric between the managers and shareholders. The decrease in information 
asymmetry is related to the increase in stock price and leads to more equity financing. Thus, firms create their 
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timing opportunities.  
 
The second form of market timing theory assumes that managers and investors are irrational which results in 
mispricing perception. According to Baker and Wurgler (2002), managers issue equity when the cost of capital is 
ridiculously small and repurchase equity when the costs of it believed irrational high. The second form does not 
require that the market is insufficient. In fact, the market can still be efficient while managers think they can time 
the market. Equity-issuing firms are those with a high market value about book values and those that earn 
positive abnormal returns before raising capital. Baker and Wurgler (2002) state that market-to-book ratio can be 
a proxy to explain market timing effects in both adverse selection and perceived mispricing; Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) could not differentiate which form dominates. To conclude, according to market timing theory, capital 
structure decisions are taken based on capital market conditions. Share prices and interest rate levels are driving 
forces for equity and debt issuance decisions respectively. The optimal leverage ratio does exist according to the 
market-timing hypothesis. 
 
2.2.2 The Miller and Modigliani Capital Structure Theory 
This theory is the cornerstone of the modern theory of capital structure; Miller and Modigliani  (1958) argue that 
the valuation of the firm will be independent of its capital structure using some fundamental assumptions. The 
researchers put it clearly that the value of the business depends on its profitability of its assets than on the way in 
which those assets are financed through debt or equity. According to Miller and Modigliani (1958), where there 
are no transaction costs, no information asymmetry, no bankruptcy cost, investors can borrow fund at the same 
rate as corporation and managers act in their interest than that one of the shareholders.  In the case of such 
situations, internal and external sources of financing are not realistic. Once the fundamental assumptions are 
relaxed, capital structure may become more relevant to the firm. These will be relaxed through the following 
theories of capital structure and explain their consequence. 
 
2.2.3 The Trade-Off Theory 
The composition of the capital structure under capital market imperfections has an impact on firms' value (Kraus 
& Litzenberg, 1973). On the other hand, debt financing increases companies' value by the cost of financial 
distress. The trade-off theory indicated that the optimal level of debt balances the corporate tax shield advantage 
of the debt financing and financial distress. The cost of financial distress was the results of bankruptcy risks 
(Kraus and Litzenberg, 1973), the agency costs (Jensen Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Stulz, 1990; Hart and 
Moore, 1995), and costs of signaling (Ross, 1977). Myers indicated that firms following the theory try to have 
their target debt-to-equity ratio and to achieve this rate for having an optimal capital structure. This is the so-
called the static trade-off theory. Therefore, the costs of adjusting capital structure constraint the adjustment 
speed towards the target debt ratio.  
 
As explain by Fischer et al. (1989) and Leland (1994) develop the dynamic trade-off model in the presence of 
capitalisation costs. Firms allow their true leverage ratio to deviate from the target rate by the different 
percentage of capital amounts. Given the results, companies do not adjust their speed towards the target if 
adjustment costs exceed the value lost to the suboptimal capital structure.  Most of the empirical literature have 
to dwell on the analysing determinants of capital structure, which are identified by theories as essential to 
inference about the importance of capital structure theories in corporate finance development. Most of the 
studies predominantly support the trade-off theory by documenting the capital structure to be influenced by the 
firm's factors such as size, growth opportunities, assets tangibility and corporate tax rate. The results were 
consistent with the predictions of the trade-off hypothesis (Titman and Wessels, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Deesomsak et al. 2004; Frank and Goyal, 2009). However, the negative correlation between debt and 
profitability found in some research does not support the theory (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 
2002; Frank & Goyal, 2009; Nguen et al., 2012). 
 
Several studies that support trade-off theory shows that firms have an optimal capital structure ratio. But may 
slightly differ from such target and seek to adjust their capital structure towards it (Marsh, 1982; Jalilvand and 
Harris, 1984; Leary and Roberts, 2005; Kayhan and Titman, 2007; Antoniou et al., 2008). Most of the studies 
document the importance of an understanding of capital structure decisions in dynamic corporate settings. 
However, some studies report that adjustment is relatively quick towards their target ratio Jalilvand and Harris, 
(1984) and some of the recorded literature states that the speed of change to the target ratio very slow (Fama and 
French, 2002; Huang and Ritter, 2009).  
 
2.2.4. The Pecking Order Theory 
The popular alternative to the trade-off model is the pecking order theory of capital structure.  Myers (1984) and 
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Myers and Majluf (1984), this approach work based on assumptions of asymmetric information, which stated 
that managers know more details about their firms than outsiders (investors). Most companies issue shares when 
stocks seem to be overstated. Investors are well aware that when stock price always declines following the 
announcement of the fresh share issue. In other words, internal funding sources do incur any floatation costs 
neither disclosure requirements from regulatory bodies. The pecking order theory recognizes the information 
asymmetry between managers and investors and differential cost of various sources of financing and asserts that 
firms will raise funds in the following pecking order – private funds followed by debt and then equity.   
 
According to the pecking order theory, corporate financing choices are driven by the cost of adverse selection 
that arises from the asymmetric information. Retained earnings have no adverse selection costs as it an internal 
source of fund, while debt is subject to some cost and equity is associated with severe adverse selection 
problems. Firms used internally generated funds to finance their operations. If the companies still need more 
money, the company will use debt to fund their operations, and equity is use as a last resort as a financing source. 
Because of the assumptions of pecking order theory states that firms do not have a target or optimal leverage. 
The debt ratios are just merely the historical accumulation of external funding requirements of the companies.  
 
As the empirical literature indicated, there is mixed evidence of pecking order theory. In the testing of pecking 
order theory, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) were among those who test the pecking order hypothesis. The 
researchers investigate the relationship between firms' net debt issues and financing the deficit and find that 
companies mainly use debt investment to offset their financing deficit, which is consistent with the pecking order 
theory assumptions. Booth et al. (2001) studies of 10 developing countries indicated that the more effective the 
firm, the lower the debt ratio which in line with the pecking order hypothesis. The applicability of the pecking 
order theory as presented in Beattie et al. (2006) when testing the capital structure of UK firms and a survey by 
Broumen et al. (2006) explain the presence of the pecking order theory for various European countries, which is 
not motivated by information asymmetry. There are some of the studies that find counter-evidence for the 
pecking order theory assumptions (Fama and French, 2002; 2005; Frank and Goyal, 2003).  
 
Frank and Goyal, (2003) documented that, net equity issues track the financing deficit very carefully more than 
net debt problems, which in turn contradict to predictions of the pecking order theory of capital structure. As 
pointed out in Fama and French (2005) that the capital structure decisions of the firms often violate the basic 
predictions principle of pecking order hypothesis. Gaud et al. (2007) examines capital structure decisions in 
European countries and argue that neither the pecking order hypothesis nor the simple trade-off theory can 
adequately explain their results. In the studies of Seifert and Gonenc (2008) find little support for the pecking 
order theory when testing using a sample of UK and US firms.  
 
However, in most studies around the world indicated that none of the theories mentioned here could fully explain 
the capital structure policies of the firms. In fact they are considered to be complementary to each other (De 
Haan and Hinloopen, 2003; Fama and French, 2005; Gaud et al., 2005; Bharath et al.; Leary and Roberts, 2010; 
De Jong et al. 2011). In the work of Rajan & Zingales (1995) indicated that determinants of leverage are in line 
with the predictions of the theories mentioned. Similar results are found in other studies like (Deesomask et al., 
2004; Antoniou et al., 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2009). Hovakimian et al. (2004), Leary and Roberts (2005) and 
Kayhan and Titman (2007) find that firms have target debts ratios but still follow the pecking order theory when 
companies adjust towards the target leverage ratio of the capital structure of the enterprise. De Jong (2011) 
indicated that the pecking order theory is the better descriptor of companies' issue decision than static trade-off 
theory of capital structure; in contrast, when focusing on repurchase decisions, the researchers find that the static 
trade-off is a better predictor of firms' capital structure ratio decisions.  
 
Fama and French (2002) argue that it 's hard to distinguish between trade-off theory and pecking order theory in 
term of variables used in one model are also relevant in the other model. When shared predictions are confirmed 
such as firms with more volatile earnings carry less debt, there is no evidence that the results of the study are due 
to trade-off forces, pecking order effects or other factors overlooked by the researchers. In this case, some of the 
studies indicated that firms follow the modified pecking order assumptions of retained earnings, equity, bank and 
possibly market debt for the case of emerging markets. There are always different institutional settings in very 
country which include Legal system, banking system, shareholders and bondholders' right protections, corporate 
governance drive firms to issue equity for long–term financing for the business. Lemmond and Zender (2010) 
provide further evidence of a modified version of the pecking order theory by incorporating the concept of debt 
capacity. The preference of the small and high-growth firms for equity finance is explaining by their growth 
opportunities and restrictive debt capacity constraints of the companies. 
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According to Brealey et al. (2006), the pecking order theory works best for large and mature firms that have 
access to public bond markets, prefer private financing and rarely issue equity. In the case of smaller growth 
companies, the pecking order theory seems to be inconsistent with empirical studies. Brealey et al. (2006) 
mention that when external financing is required these little companies are more likely to rely on equity 
issuance, which is against the theory of Pecking Order. 
 
2.2.5 The Signaling Theory 
The signaling theory was documented by Ross (1977) based on the asymmetry information assumption between 
managers and investors. Considering that insiders know the real distribution of firms' return as investors do not 
have any knowledge, the theory states that market derives from an increase in debt that companies are better off, 
leading to an increase in share price. The market derives conversely from a decrease in debt, implying a share 
price fall within a particular time. Consequently, managers can release information to the market when they 
change corporate leverage.  
 
Therefore, more profitable companies and those with the better perspectives for future growth use more debt as 
sources of the fund than less profitable firms and those with fewer perspectives for growth. In the developed 
markets, several studies have investigated the important of signaling theory in the development of corporate 
capital structures. In consensus with the hypothesis of the signaling theory, Giner and Reverte (2001) find 
evidence in support of the debt is positive signaling effects related to corporate financing decisions and finance 
that industry average debt ratio has a positive signaling effect for medium systematic risk firms. In most of the 
empirical literature have most commonly cited the explanation of signaling theory, (Fried, 2009; Rau and 
Vermaelen, 2002; Baker et al., 2003; Luis and White, 2007).  
 
In Fried (2000) work, cash distributed to public shareholders through three difference ways that are dividends, 
open market repurchases and repurchases tender offer rather than open market repurchases or dividend is that 
managers intentionally signal of undervaluation. In the study of the Australian environment, Mitchell and 
Dharmawan (2007) find the incentives for on-market buy-back are related to not only signaling of 
undervaluation but also signaling of reducing agency cost and information asymmetry in the market. This in 
agreement with Peyer and Vemaelen (2009) finds that there is evidence of positive long-term abnormal returns 
after repurchase announcement; the finding is in line with the survey results of Brav et al., (2005).  
The empirical evidence supports such predictions of signaling theory as an adverse market reaction on leverage-
decreasing transactions and positive response on leverage-increasing transactions (excluding debt issues). The 
evidence is not supportive regarding market response to debt problems and a negative correlation between debt 
and profitability.  
 
Also how to explain that shortly after the issue firms issuing equity have better operating performance than non-
issuing businesses and in the long run they tend to underperform those firms? Many ideas have been developed 
to explain why high-profit firms may use equity as a signal. These include signaling small variance of earnings, 
signaling medium-level gains in the model with three types of companies, signaling in a model that combines 
asymmetric information with agency problems (Brick, Frierman & Kim 1998, Noe 1988, Noe & Rebello, 1996), 
etc. A challenge for researchers today is to find a model that will be able to explain several significant empirical 
phenomena simultaneously. From our perspective, two directions can be considered as most prominent: dynamic 
extensions of signaling models and security design patterns. 
 
2.2.6. The Agency Cost Theory 
The agency cost theory proposed by Jensen and Mackling, (1976) and Jensen (1986), to explains the corporate 
capital structure decisions based on an agency problem between the shareholders and managers of the firm.  
Agency theory identifies two types of conflicts: a) conflicts between managers and shareholders, and b) disputes 
between debt holders and equity holders. The former arise because managers hold less than 100% of remaining 
claims. Therefore they have the incentive to transfer substantial resources to their personal benefit. 
 
The recent conflicts arise because the debt contract gives equity holders an incentive to invest in a manner 
detrimental to the debt holders' interest because of the different risk-sharing characteristics of equity and debt. 
The term "agency" derives from the fact that corporate decisions delegated to agents who perform on behalf of 
other parties. Agency theory considers the firm as a nexus of contracts. The resolving of agency problems 
through contractual arrangements leads to the evolution of corporate finance. When companies use debt as 
sources of financing, conflict of interest kick in between shareholders and bondholders given the remoteness 
between the interest groups and in this case, firms' debt financing, has two effects. It decreases the agency costs 
between shareholders and bondholders. The shareholders expropriate value from bondholders by selecting risky 
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portfolios. If the firms invest in a risky portfolio, the debt holders require a higher return for their financing. 
Therefore, the gain from the project will accrue to debt holders rather than shareholders.  
 
Chung (1993) examines the empirical relationship between firm's assets characteristics and financial leverage, 
based on the hypothesis derived from the agency theory literature. His study includes 1449 companies (out of 
which 319 are in regulated industries) and covers a five years period 1980- 1984. Since both equity and debt 
incur agency costs, the agency cost theory states that an optimal corporate capital structure determined by 
reducing the costs arising from conflicts between the involved parties. The effect of ownership structure and 
managerial traits in reducing agency costs also emphasised in the empirical literature.  
 
Anderson et al. (2003) find that founding family firms have incentive structures that lead to fewer agency 
conflicts between shareholders and debt holders as compare with the public companies. As a result, a lower cost 
of debt financing achieved. As indicated by Parrino et al. (2005) that risk-averse managers are biased against 
risky projects in spite of the fact that they could gain benefits from higher project risk. The researcher found that 
confident or overconfident managers choose higher debt levels than rational executives, while biased 
administrators' decisions could increase the value of the firm by reducing shareholders and bondholders' conflicts 
of interest given the remoteness of the relationship between them and the managers. 
 
3.1 Empirical studies 
Although the market timing theory is new capital structure theory, the idea is long rooted in the literature. Some 
other early papers document the support of market timing hypothesis (Marsh, 1982; Lucas and McDonald, 1990; 
Ritter, 1991; and Loughran et al. 1994).  In the survey of European firms, Bancel and Mittoo (2004) found that 
managers are more active in selecting the timing of equity issues, and issuing shares after an increase in the 
firm's stock price is a crucial factor 
 
Marsh (1982) investigates security issues of UK businesses, and the results reveal that companies are strongly 
affected by market situations and history of security prices when considering between financing sources 
instruments. In the work of Lucas and McDonald (1990) presented a model, which predicts that equity issues on 
average preceded by an abnormal positive return on the share or an equity rise in the market. Mahajan and 
Tartaroglu (2007) found that in all G-7 countries leverage of firms is negatively correlated to the historical 
market-to-book value, which is in line with the market timing theory. 
 
Most studies show that companies that are issuing shares whether IPOs experiences poor performance (Ritter, 
1991; Loughran et al., 1994; Longhran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995). These findings show 
that firms took advantage of windows of opportunities when the share prices overstated. Some of the studies 
documented the relationship between market-to-book ratio and capital structure in G7 countries and found that 
market-to-book ratio correlated to average. The researcher presented this as an evidence of market timing despite 
the unclearly theoretical underpinning of these correlations among them. In similar cases, Pagano et al. (1998) 
find that among determinants of going public decisions in a sample of Italian companies for the period 1982-
1992 industries market-to-book is the most crucial one. 
 
The survey conducted by Graham and Harvey (2001) supported the evidence of market timing. The study reveals 
that market timing is a primary concern of CFOs in their financing decisions among the sources. In this case, 
firm issues short-term debt in an effort to time market interest rates, and managers are reluctant to issue equity 
when a company is considered undervalued or stated.  
 
Hovakimian et al. (2001) test both equity and debt issuance decisions in the light of prevailing theories of capital 
structure that is trade-off theory and pecking order theory of capital structure among others. However, the study 
documents that share prices play a crucial role in determining the choice of firms' of financing sources. 
Businesses that experience stock prices increases are more likely to issues equity and retire debt than are the 
companies that experience share price decreases. Most managers are reluctant to issue equity when companies' 
stock prices are understated. 
 
As indicated in Huang Ritter (2009) companies fund their deficit by net external equity when the cost of capital 
is lower. The other support of market timing theory documented as the historical values of the cost of equity 
capital has persistence influence on firms' capital structures, even after controlling for firm features that have 
recognised as the most significant determinants of capital structure. The relevancy of the market timing theory 
verified in different institutional settings. Several studies find a negative relationship between marketing timing 
measure and leverage for the Netherlands, France and 13 European countries respectively, De Bie and De Haan 
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(2007), Bougatef and Chichti (2010) and Gaud et al. (2007). Several papers indicated that security issuance 
decisions in developing countries are motivated by the market timing theory (Henderson et al., 2006, Cohen et 
al., 2007; Bo et al., 2011).  
 
The seminal work Baker and Wurgler (2002), studies on market timing generated a lot of interest in the area of 
the capital structure. Most of the literature could consider as reactions to the finding of Baker and Wurgler 
(2002), which defined the capital structure as a cumulative outcome of attempts to time the equity market, and 
the effects of historical market values on capital structure are a long lasting impact.  According to Taggart 
(1977), the paper suggests evidence that is movements in the market values of long-term debt and equity are 
important determinants of US firms' security issuance decisions. 
 
Several studies indicate the existence of market timing theory persistent impact on capital structure decisions. 
The study by Jenter (2005) of managerial timing provides evidence of market timing both at a corporate and 
administrative level in which firms with low market-to-book ratio are considered as value businesses; while 
companies with the high market-to-book ratio considered as growth companies. Managers in these enterprises 
purchase equity on their own, and repurchase for their businesses. 
 
Elliott et al. (2008), uses the residual income model to measure the effect of the misevaluation of equity and the 
impact of market timing on corporate financing decisions by firms. The results are consistent with Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) as companies are most likely to issue equity to finance their deficit when equity overvalued.  
More evidence of market timing theory does not only come from the investment but also debt markets of the 
results of capital structure choices of firms. As documented by Bancel and Mittoo (2004) and Baker et al. (2003) 
evidence of forwarding-looking market timing. When predicting the future interest rate reduces, managers tend 
to make short-term debt issuance decisions, whereas when predicting the increases in future interest rate, they 
tend to make long-term debt issuance decisions. Barry et al. (2008) find evidence of backward-looking market 
timing that firms issue more debt about investment spending and equity when interest rates are low compared 
with historical values. Henderson et al. (2006) examine both equity and debt market timing internationally.  
 
The findings indicated that market timing is particularly important in security issuance decisions by firms' 
management. When interest rates are lower, companies tend to issue long-term debt and before the increase in 
the interest rate. Doukas et al. (2011) indicated that perceived capital market situations as favourable lead 
companies to issue more debt in hot than in cold market periods. Furthermore, there is a lasting hot-debt market 
impact on the capital structure of debt issuers.  There are two criticisms against the work of Baker and Wurgler 
(2002). Firstly, given many consensuses on the temporary effect of market timing on capital structure, the 
persistent impact of this situation remains unconvincing as stated in several studies (Leary and Roberts, 2005; 
Alti, 2006; Flanner and Rangan, 2006; De Bie and De Haan, 2007; Kayhan and Titman, 2007; Nguyen and 
Boubaker, 2009). Alti (2006) put more emphasis on a single financing source as an initial public offering; this is 
an attempt to capture market timing and its impact on the capital structure. The author defines market timers as 
the firms that go public in the "hot issue market, which is high market valuations and strong IPO volume 
regarding some issuers. 
 
Alti (2006) findings show that hot-market issuers have lower leverage ratios than cold-market firms do. These 
results lead to the conclusion that market timing is a crucial determinant of financing activity in the short-run, 
but its long-run effects are limited. In support of Alti (2006), Flanner and Ranagan (2006) confirmed the 
existence of the market timing for security issuance but did not support Baker and Wurgler (2002) position on 
the persistence of the impact of market timing on capital structure. The volatility in share prices are found to 
have a short-term impact on debt ratios, but efforts to reach the target leverage ratio offset these transitory effects 
within a few years.  
 
The study conducted by Kayhan and Titman (2007) find adverse effects of actual market-to-book ratio on US 
corporate leverage, but do not confirm its long-term persistence. The findings indicate although firm's history 
strongly affects their capital structure decision; financing choices tend to move towards targets debt ratios over 
time, which is consistent with the trade-off theory. The findings are supporting Leary and Roberts (2005) 
position as they argued that firms actively rebalance their leverage so that the impact of market timing 
disappeared within three to five years following equity issuances by businesses.  
 
The study conducted by Hovakimian (2006) question Baker and Wurgler (2002) conclusion that capital structure 
is the cumulative outcome of past attempts at equity market timing. There was no significant evidence found by 
the author about equity market timing for the debt issues and debt reduction in firms' capital structure choices. 
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Although equity transactions may conduct to time equity market situations, they do not have significant, long-
lasting effects on the capital structure. The study also finds that the impact of market-to-book ratio on leverage is 
not due to equity market timing but reveal growth opportunities of the firms. 
 
Secondly, The problem of the market timing is the inappropriate use of historical cost market-to-book ratio to 
appropriately proxy for a company's market timing attempts. Although this issue is raised by Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) in their study and there have been claims by authors that they believe their findings are consistent with 
equity mispricing in the presence of irrational investors or managers, there are alternative interpretations. The 
use of market-to-book to test market timing is overwhelmed with difficulties. Such difficulties result from the 
multiple interpretations of what the ratio captures, for example, asymmetric information, growth options, and 
debt overhang problems (Elliott et al., 2007). Hovakimian (2006) and Kayhan and Titman (2007) indicate that 
the driving force behind the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2002) is not past equity market timing, but the 
growth opportunities for the firms. Many studies are using different methods to measure market timing 
compared with Baker and Wurgler (2002) to examine the market timing theory.  
 
Jorgensen and Terra (2002) conducted their studies in seven Latin American countries in which they investigate 
the effect of the tangibility, size, profitability, growth opportunities, taxes, and business were studied in each 
country. In their studies, the impact of macroeconomics and institutional factors were examined using pooled 
regression analysis. As the results indicated that profitability was only the one shows consistency negative 
behaviour, and limited support was found for business risk.  
 
There is empirical evidence from different studies that shed more support for a positive relationship when book 
value leverage was used, but the sign of the relationship turned negative when the market value leverage are 
utilised by the firms.  The findings of pooled country estimation also indicated that the profitability is the only 
one that showing negative consistency across the different components of the capital structure. The impact of 
real GDP growth and inflation were found to be negative, while their combined explanatory power was not 
remarkable. But the most significant findings of the study by Jorgensen and Terra  (2002), the explanatory 
strength of the firm-specific factors outweighed the explanatory strength of the institutional and macroeconomic 
factors that are external to the firms.  
 
Green and Mutenheri (2002) in their study of the impact of economic reform programme on financing choices 
for listed companies in Zimbabwe came to the conclusion that Zimbabwean firms relied heavily on the external 
funding sources. While long-term bank loans were found to make little contribution to the financing of the 
corporate sector, the share market was considered to contribute significantly. Asset tangibility, tax rate, growth 
opportunities, earnings volatility and bank liquidity, were found to be significant determinants of capital 
structure. The study also found that economic reform programmes had little success in opening up the financial 
markets and improving transparency of financing behaviour of firms. 
 
Ngugi (2008) conducted studies of capital investment behaviour of listed companies on the Nairobi Security 
Exchange (NSE). Accordingly the study use sample of 22 firms for the period of 1990 to 1999 and using 
modified static trade-off and pecking order models, her findings shows that the primary determinants of capital 
financing behaviour of listed firms on Nairobi Security Exchange are information asymmetry, non-debt tax 
shields and local capital market infrastructure.  
 
Nyang'oro (2003) study comprised a sample of 20 listed non-financial firms for the period from 1993 to 2001 in 
which the results were contradicting to the previous findings by other researchers. His findings show that tax rate 
was significant in explaining leverage, but with a wrong negative sign. Non-debt tax shield was insignificant in 
explaining force. In other hands, profitability, tangibility and growth opportunities were found to be significant 
in explaining the capital structure of the sampled firms drawn from the study. 
 
Abor and bike (2005) conducted a study on the determinants of the capital structure of listed companies, large 
unlisted firm and small and medium enterprises (SME) in Ghana using panel data analysis for the period 1998 to 
2003. Their findings for listed large and unlisted firms had higher debt ratios as compared to SMEs. The findings 
revealed that total debt constituted more than 50% of the capital structure of the sampled firms. The study also 
found that profitability, the age of the firm, the size of the firm, asset structure and risk were significant in 
influencing decisions on capital structure in Ghana. The market timing has persistence effect on capital structure.   
 
Negash (2002) conduct a study on the relationship between corporate tax and a firm's capital structure. He 
obtained a sample of 64 industrial sector firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) for the period 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.8, No.6, 2017 
 
91 
1991-1998 in South Africa. He ran an OLS on leverage model and found a negative relationship between tax rate 
variables and extent of leverages. There was no relationship between investment related tax shields and debt 
related shield that is consistent with Titman and Wessels (1998) but a direct contradiction of proposition by De 
Angelo and Masulis (1980). Negash found the primary determinants of leverage to be its lagged variable. 
Liquidity of assets, asset tangibility, size and actual taxes paid were also found to significantly explain leverage.  
 
The study conducted by Chen (2004) on capital structure determinants of listed firms in China using panel data 
regression and the findings of the study were different from those of developed countries due to institutional 
differences among countries. He concluded that Chinese firm neither followed the pecking order nor the trade-
off theory. Also found that instead to follow what he termed as "new pecking order" in which a firm's preference 
for funds is retained earnings first followed by equity and then long-term debt. He argued that while western 
models that sought to concentrate on firm characteristics as determinants of capital choices, models that tend to 
explain the behaviour of determinants of capital structure in China needed to look at institutional factors as these 
also played a critical role. 
 
The study conducted by De Jong et al. (2008) analysed the direct and indirect impacts of firms specific and 
macroeconomic factors on the corporate capital structure for some companies from developed and developing 
countries. Their findings revealed that tangibility and company's size in the some of the countries had a positive 
effect on long-term debt ratios at market value, whereas growth opportunities and profitability had an adverse 
effect. Bie and Haan (2007) evidence of market timing is found, but there is no long-lasting persistence of the 
effect. The same result found in the Shenzhen market in the study conducted by Tian, Shao and Luo (2008). In 
most of the studies that conducted on the market timing and capital structure have not talked about the issues of 
other countries that do not allow repurchase of share, for example, Kenya do not allow repurchase of shares.  
 
3.2 Summary of the study 
The empirical studies reviewed reveal that market timing affects capital structure and firms performance. What 
comes out clearly is that its impact and magnitude on capital structure not clearly stated as different studies 
reveal mixed results. One set of results from empirical studies reveals that can create distortion of the capital 
structure of the firms in the market while the other set claims that the impact of market timing on capital 
structure is not persistent. The reason for this inconsistency not known from the current literature and empirical 
studies is subject to further future research. The exact through which market timing affect capital structure has 
not been clearly identified, and neither is the timing or management aspect of the firms.  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
In the review of the theoretical literature and empirical studies, it is evident that academic research on market 
timing and capital structure still give controversial and mix finding which shows that there is still need to do 
more research on the impact of market timing on capital structure. Through the lack of consensus, therefore 
objective one and two could not be achieved. These points bring the existence of a knowledge gap on the 
persistent impact of market timing on the capital structure of the firms.   
 
In light of the mixed evidence, there is need to test the dynamic trade-off model under several assumptions. First, 
we assume that the target debt-equity ratio follows an AR (1) process. Second, we assume that the target debt-
equity ratio is constant. Finally, as a robustness check, we also consider a third scenario, under which the target 
debt-equity ratio follows a random walk process, making the target debt-equity ratio completely unpredictable 
based on previous information. Therefore, there is still room to close the gaps by academic researchers and 
consultancies to come up with more robust research to create a competitive advantage for firms to achieve 
optimal capital structure using market-timing strategy. Empirical studies also show no consensus since studies 
conducted locally arrived at mixed conclusions as per the case of (Ngugi, 2008, and Nyangoro, 2003) and many 
others. This problem has resulted in the loss of investors' wealth and confidence in the stock market. Studies on 
the relationship between various financing decisions and performance have produced mixed results. It is against 
this background that this technical literature review conducted. 
 
3.4 The research gaps identified 
On critically evaluating the existing literature, it observed that most empirical studies on the impacts of market 
timing on the capital structure are shown a lack of consensus, which continues to give mixed findings. Empirical 
studies also provide no consensus since even studies conducted within emerging market arrive at different 
conclusion or results as shown in Ngugi, (2008), and Nyangoro, (2003), which they did not consider the market 
timing as one aspect of their variables. 
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Therefore, most of the studies were focusing on the countries specific factors, and others emphasis on 
institutional factors as well as macroeconomic factors to assess the effect of country-specific factors on the 
capital structure firms in developing markets. The other studies have shown that the impacts of market timing on 
capital structure are the same across developed and emerging markets. This implies that variables used in the 
developed markets are also applicable in the developing markets regardless of macroeconomic environments. 
Furthermore, the Market Timing Theory is relatively modern and less investigated in the developing market, 
especially African markets. This lack of studies in the developing market is the knowledge gaps plus 
inconsistency documented by research in the developed market. This could be tested in the future using the 
available data in the developing market like Kenya. This inconsistency and mixed findings constitute knowledge 
gaps, which this review seeks to fill these gaps. 
 
3.5 Future Research  
This study has laid a good platform for conducting further research, which includes, 
 
To establishment of the findings on the differential impact of market timing on the capital structure of firms in 
the developing markets which can lead to further insights into socioeconomic connections and provide useful 
information to investors. 
 
To inform policy makers for further policy reforms to stabilize the returns on shareholders wealth and also 
determine ways of increasing policy coordination to achieve the desired relationship between market timing and 
capital structure in developing markets.  
 
Further research can be recommended to determine what constitutes significant adjustments for the optimal 
capital structure of firms to align their cost of capital policies and allow a period of the market timing system 
coordinate sustainable firm performance in developing markets. The area of future research on the impact of 
market timing on capital structure in emerging market should be conducted using available data from developing 
markets to compare the outcome with those of developed markets. Studies on the relationship between various 
financing decisions and performance have produced mixed results. It is against this background this study 
conducted. 
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